How do legislators work? Addressing the issue of legislative review
Keywords:
Legislative review, control, parliament, legislator, ArgentinaAbstract
Legislative review refers to the government initiatives amending. This activity is carried out by legislators and has been mistakenly associated by researchers with parliamentary oversight, as demonstrated in this article. Rather, it has to do with a specific set of factors related to the regime (parliamentarism or presidentialism) and the type of parliament (arena or transformation parliament). The regime factors refer to the legislative powers held by the head of government (president or prime minister) and the leading conditions of a parliamentary majority. Parliamentary factors include the degree of influence that parties exert on the legislative process and the autonomy of legislators in parliamentary committees. Regarding methodology, this article is based on a review of the political science literature on regimes and parliaments, and on parliamentary oversight. Finally, a comprehensive assessment of legislative review in Argentina is provided as a conclusion.
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